Recent advances in unmanned and autonomous vehicle technology are accelerating the push to integrate these vehicles into human-centered environments such as commercial aviation and public roads. Much of the current research into autonomous systems examines improving the performance of individual unmanned vehicles or improving the safety of their interactions with individual humans; very little examines the behavior of the broader system. For large-scale transportation systems, real-world field trials involving unmanned vehicles are difficult to execute due to concerns of cost, feasibility of construction, and the maturity of the technologies. This paper describes the use of an agent-based model of unmanned vehicle behavior in human-centered environments to explore the effects of their implementation in these domains. In particular, this work explores how safety protocols governing the integration of manned and unmanned vehicles affect performance in an aircraft carrier ground control environment. Three different types of futuristic unmanned vehicle control architectures are considered in conjunction with four different types of safety protocols: dynamic, area, temporal, and combined area+temporal separation. Results demonstrate that measures of safety vary widely across these systems, demonstrating distinct tradeoffs of safety and mission performance as well as across different safety measures.
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I. Introduction
Unmanned vehicles -in which there is no human operator seated within the vehicle and vehicle behavior is controlled remotely -have been used for years in a variety of domains, but it is only relatively recently that they have improved to the point that integrating them into human-centered civilian environments has become realistic. Of particular interest to the civilian population are the introduction of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system and the introduction of increased autonomy into automobiles. While the FAA is currently focused on the integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into the national airspace, unmanned aircraft must also collaborate and interact with flight crew and other aircraft in ground operations at airports. An additional similar domain is that of the aircraft carrier flight deck, for which the Navy is currently developing unmanned combat aircraft [1, 2] .
The domains of automobile driving, airport operations, and aircraft carrier flight deck operations can all be characterized as heterogeneous manned environments -places in which humans work in close proximity to and in close collaboration with manually-controlled vehicles in a shared physical space. This work concerns the future versions of these domains, characterized as Heterogeneous Manned-Unmanned Environments (HMUEs), which will require that unmanned vehicles interact with personnel on foot and other manually-controlled vehicles. This transition may require the development of new paradigms of interaction for these personnel to work effectively with these unmanned vehicles. Changes to operating procedures may also be required to accommodate differences in capabilities between unmanned and manned vehicles. To this date, no research addressing what these changes might be and how these changes, and the introduction of unmanned vehicles that they enable, might affect the performance of the broader system has been observed.
Insight into the effects of unmanned vehicle integration in these larger-scale systems could be gained by field-testing prototype systems, but these environments are of such large scale (both in size and number of active elements) that testing them in any meaningful manner would require significant investments of time, money, and physical resources. Even if these resources could be provided, if the unmanned vehicle systems being tested are not yet technologically mature, the results may not be useful. Such tests might also place the autonomous systems, the researchers involved in the study, and any bystanders in unforeseen danger, as well as be severely limited in the conditions that could be explored.
A. Agent-Based Modeling
Agent-based modeling [3] is one potential approach for addressing such limitations; these models attempt to replicate the individual decision-making, motion, and interactions of actors within a given environment. Constructing validated models of the real world system provides an avenue for testing unmanned vehicle performance under a variety of test conditions that may not be easily achievable.
This research examines the use of an agent-based simulation of a candidate HMUE, the aircraft carrier flight deck, in order to examine how different types of Safety Protocols (SPs) could be employed to limit interactions between manned and unmanned aircraft and what the resulting effects of operational safety might be. Three different types of UAV Control Architectures (CAs) are explored, all modeling advanced autonomous systems that could be introduced in the future.
As described by Eric Bonabeau [3] , agent-based modeling is as much a perspective as it is a methodology. Whereas the use of discrete-event or systems dynamics models elicits specific ideas of structure and constituent components, agent-based models may vary widely in content and in methods of application. Examples range from human decision-making (ex. [4] ) to epidemiology and disease transmission (ex. [5] ) to transportation systems involving both ground and aerial vehicles (ex. [6] ), among many others. What matters is that, in each case, the agent-based modeling paradigm views the world "from the perspective of its constituent units" [3] -that the agents retain the same independence and employ similar decision-making strategies as the real-world entities they are intended to replicate. The agents are then placed into the simulated environment, given a set of goals (which may be self-generated during the simulation), and allowed to make decisions independently from that point forward.
While agent-based modeling has been used to validate control and sensing algorithms for a variety of UAV systems (e.g., [7] ), these studies have primarily addressed systems involving the collaboration of multiple autonomous vehicles in performing tasks, such as searching for and tracking targets, and only include limited interactions with other entities. Another common, and related, area of interest is in the modeling and control of UAV "swarms" (large, coordinated groups of robots coordinating on a specific task) [8] . Agent-based models have also been built to test unmanned vehicle survivability [9] and single UAV search [10] . However, none of these examples has considered the role of the human in interacting with the vehicle system. While other non-agent-based models of human-UAV interaction have been constructed [11, 12] , these models have focused on the human as a processing server working within a queuing system, considering the behavior of the vehicle only in the sense that it requires the operator to provide a task for it. In order to better understand the practical requirements for UAVs in these HMUEs, models of UAV motion in the world, UAV task execution, and UAV interactions with their operators, other human personnel, and other vehicles in the world must be generated.
B. Agent-based Modeling in Vehicular Domains
Agent-based modeling for safety research has also occurred, addressing both the automobile [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] and airspace safety [18] [19] [20] [21] . Traffic safety models have focused both on driver interactions at intersections [13] and highway traffic [14, 15] . Airspace safety analyses have dealt both the national airspace system in general [18] as well as more localized models of runway interactions at airports [19] [20] [21] .
In these prior studies, the simulated drivers and pilots act independently in the environment based on a set of defined goals and behavioral rules, with metrics of performance focusing on both true accidents (where possible) and near-accidents -near collisions that suggest a high probability of an accident in reality. Airspace safety simulations have also investigated how changes in behavior affect the system, addressing both pilot [20, 21] and air traffic controller behaviors [19] affect the system. However, at this time, few studies have focused on the interaction of manned and unmanned vehicles within the same shared physical environment, or on how the methods of controlling those unmanned vehicles and the rules of behavior within the environment affect the safety of operations.
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The goal of the Multi-Agent Safety and Control Simulation (MASCS) model described within this paper was to generate an agent-based model of aircraft carrier flight deck operations that provided an ability to model not only various types on unmanned vehicle control architectures, but that also provided an ability to modify the rules of behavior in the environment: when and where manuallypiloted and unmanned aircraft were allowed to interact with one another. This paper begins with a description of the MASCS model and its modeling of aircraft carrier flight deck operations. The three different unmanned vehicle control architectures of interest are then described, followed by a discussion of current aircraft carrier flight deck operations and how they are modeled within the Multi-Agent Safety and Control Simulation (MASCS). Afterwards, the modeling of the unmanned vehicle control architectures within MASCS is described, followed by a description of the testing of these vehicles under a variety of mission conditions and process-level task definitions.
II. The MASCS Agent-Based Model of Aircraft Carrier Flight Deck Operations
The MASCS model is an agent-based model of aircraft carrier flight deck operations that includes models of human flight deck crew, manually controlled aircraft operating on deck, unmanned aircraft, and supervisory control staff that oversee operations. Before defining the models of unmanned vehicle control architectures used in this work, a simulation of current aircraft carrier flight deck operations using manually-piloted aircraft was constructed and validated against empirical data, the process of which is described in [22] . Constructing the model required defining agents that replicate the behavior of human crew, pilots, aircraft, planning supervisors, flight deck equipment, as well as models of the tasks that they perform. Agent and task models consist of decision-making rules that govern agent behavior, parameters that describe how agents view and execute tasks in the world, and states that are viewable by other agents and are used in the decision-making routines.
The MASCS model was validated as part of prior work [22] that compared the performance of individual aircraft and missions of multiple aircraft against empirical data on operations. Validating the model in this fashion provided support for the validity of the modeling in replicating flight deck operations both in terms of system performance and in terms of the individual agent models.
5
The models of Manual Control (MC) vehicles were then used as templates for the creation of the unmanned vehicle control architectures of interest. The next section describes the basics of flight deck operations relevant to this work and how these operations were modeled within MASCS before discussing the modeling of the unmanned vehicle control architectures in Section II B.
A. Aircraft Carrier Flight Deck Operations
A digitized map of the flight deck appears in Figure 1 . Labels in the figure highlight the important features of the flight deck environment relevant to launch operations. At this time, the MASCS simulation focuses solely on launch operations, where future work may extend the modeling to other phases of flight. In launch operations, aircraft begin parked at the edges of the flight deck in the aft and starboard areas of deck; aircraft not able to fit in those areas are parked in the area known as "The Street." Aircraft will be assigned to launch from one of the four launch catapults (orange lines in the figure, numbered one to four). Each catapult is capable of launching a single aircraft at a time, but adjacent pairs of aircraft (1,2 or 3,4) are not able to operate in parallel, for two reasons. The first is that a single set of crew operates each pair of catapults and can only manage one catapult at a time. The second, and more important, is that the catapults are angled towards one another -simultaneous launches would result in a collision and loss of both aircraft.
Catapults alternate launches within each pair, but the two pairs can process in parallel (e.g., 1 and 3 or 2 and 4). Operations typically allow one aircraft on the catapult and another waiting behind a protective barrier that rises from the deck during a launch. As such, each pair of catapults (if both are active) can queue up to four aircraft in the area at any time, but only one aircraft will be in the process of launching. aircraft that has an open taxi route to this catapult is assigned. This preserves some flexibility in the face of the stochasticity of the launch preparation process.
Aircraft assignments are then passed to a set of crew on the flight deck, termed Aircraft Directors (yellow circles in Fig. 1 ), who provide taxi instructions to aircraft. These crew work in a form of "zone coverage," each controlling a specific area of the deck (which may overlap with others). A Director will taxi the aircraft through their area, then hand the aircraft over to an adjacent Director before accepting another aircraft into their area. Aircraft are passed between Directors until they reach their assigned catapult. Directors communicate instructions to pilots using a set of hand gestures, informing the pilot when to drive forward, stop, turn, and to whom they are being passed off. Directors also must maintain an understanding of current traffic conditions on the flight deck, delaying some aircraft to allow other aircraft to taxi by. This may be because the other aircraft has a higher priority, or that failing to do so would "lock" the deck, with aircraft unable to taxi to their require destinations.
Modeling these operations requires several agents within the MASCS simulation, each with their own sets of decision rules described each of the features above. The Deck Handler agent requires a model of their assignment heuristics, also developed as part of prior work [23] . Aircraft Director agents require a model of the other Directors they can pass aircraft to, whether or not they can currently hand the aircraft to the desired next Director or accept new aircraft themselves, as well as how to align to the aircraft they are currently instructing so that they are visible to the pilot.
Directors also require models of their speed of movement on the flight deck, as do aircraft. Within MASCS, aircraft and pilots are modeled as a single unit at this time, requiring the definition of their speed and motion profiles, their ability to detect a Director, and their ability to execute tasks.
Additional agents characterize the flight deck and the catapults used by aircraft during operations.
Task models provide the rules of behavior that dictate whether or not an agent can conduct a task and how it should be executed once execution can occur. For instance, for an aircraft motion task, rules determine (1) whether the aircraft can see its assigned Director, (2) whether the Director is allowing the aircraft to taxi because of traffic conditions, and (3) if another aircraft is physically in the way of the current vehicle. In extending MASCS to include unmanned vehicles into operations, different UAV types require changes to the models described above. The general planning methods do not differ substantially, nor do the models of physical motion. However, rules governing task execution for manual control operations or taxi routing on the flight deck may not apply to unmanned vehicle systems due to differences in the architecture of the systems. Other parameters describing the vehicles' physical characteristics might also vary from the baseline model of human Manual Control (MC). The differences that define the four unmanned vehicle control architectures used in this work are discussed in the next section.
B. Models of Unmanned Vehicle Behavior
The Manual Control (MC) operations described in the previous section serve as the baseline comparison point for the three unmanned vehicle control architectures modeled in MASCS. The first of these unmanned architectures, Gesture Control (GC), replaces the human operator with a set of stereo vision cameras teamed with a sophisticated computer algorithm. This system replicates the same visual observation and interpretation tasks conducted by the pilot: the system observes deck crew, translating the hand and arm gestures provided by those crew into actions such as "taxi forward," and "turn left." As such, GC vehicles are a direct replacement for MC vehicles and no 8 other changes to operations are required.
Advanced supervisory control systems require more substantial modifications to operations. In these systems, a single human operator issues commands to vehicles and receives feedback on their activity through a Graphical User Interface (GUI). Typically, commands are issued in a high-level, abstract form such as "taxi to this waypoint" or "monitor this area;" these commands are broken down into more specific inputs by the autonomy onboard the vehicle or contained in the operator's workstation.
These systems can be classified into two general forms. The first form is referred to here as Vehicle-based Human Supervisory Control (VHSC), in which supervisors supply commands to a single vehicle at a time, working iteratively through the queue of vehicles awaiting tasks (e.g. [24] ).
Here, the operator serves as a processing server in the system, managing a queue of vehicles awaiting new instructions that the operator processes at some distribution of service times under a certain queuing policy (e.g. first-in, first out). The larger the number of vehicles in the system, the longer the time between successive interactions with any individual vehicle.
For systems with greater than 8-12 vehicles, additional autonomy is often introduced in the form of planning and scheduling algorithms that simultaneously replan all tasks for all vehicles (ex. [25] ).
These are referred to as System-based Human Supervisory Control (SHSC) systems. The operator typically provides goals and constraints for the scheduling algorithm, which will calculate a new schedule and present it to the operator for review. The operator then has the option of accepting, rejecting, or modifying the schedule before it is transmitted to the vehicles for execution. Once accepted, new task schedules are uploaded for all vehicles, which begin executing their individual task lists.
In the context of flight deck operations and models of agent behavior, the important activities of a pilot that must be replicated by these three unmanned vehicle control architectures (GC, VHSC, and SHSC) can be summarized in terms of three key aspects: visual detection of an Aircraft
Director that is attempting to provide instructions, correctly interpreting task instructions, and correctly executing the commanded tasks. Each of these corresponds to a related variable: the probability of observing the Director if within the vehicle's field of view, the probability of correctly interpreting the command, and the probability of correctly executing a task. For manual control, the likelihoods of these failures are so low that subject matter experts consider them as essentially nonexistent. While a fourth difference in behavior comes from the fact that the Director is providing instructions in this "zone coverage" routing; this does not occur for the advanced supervisory control systems, thus how vehicles are routed forms a fourth behavioral variable of "routing method."
Two other variables also affect vehicle behavior, relating to the physical characteristics of the vehicle: the field of view of the pilot/aircraft, which describes where the Director should be in order to provide commands, and the latency in processing commands. The field of view for manual operations is related to human sight range and the constraints of being in the cockpit; for unmanned vehicles, field of view is related to the cameras used on the vehicle. The latency in processing commands could come from a number of sources: delays in the communication of signals between operator and vehicle, the time required for the vehicle's computer system to process, or time required for the human operator to interact with the system. Each of these can also be modeled as variables within the MASCS simulation environment. The following paragraphs describe how these variables are defined for the control architectures used in this work, beginning with the set of variables that relates to visual processes.
Visual Acquisition Parameters
The first primary task of a pilot, visual acquisition, describes the process of visually identifying the current Director that is providing instructions to the pilot. GC systems must also perform this task, enabled by sensors and processing algorithms included on the aircraft. Associated with this task is a chance of failing to recognize the Director. Because these systems are still largely in the research and development phase, there is no true failure rate known for gesture control activity in the flight deck environment. A review of several papers, most of which include data for multiple tests and trials and reference multiple prior studies, provides a picture of the current general state of gesture recognition research [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] . Of the 146 different experimental results reported, 11 report results of 100% accuracy (often using data sets with a small number of very different gestures), 37 reported results better than 95%, and 91 reported better than 90% accuracy. Overall, the studies report an average failure rate of 11.18%.
It is not clear how this failure rate translates into realistic future operations; while the technology will certainly improve, a variety of environmental conditions (sun glare, obstructions, large numbers of moving vehicles) will limit performance in the real world. While future real-world failure rates are still not known, the median failure rate of 11.18% observed in the research is used as the failure rate of the baseline GC system. The GC system is modeled with the capability of failing repeatedly, modeled as a series of Bernoulli trials. In doing so, it is assumed that the system does not encounter cases in which it cannot determine a solution (or that it can at least be overridden by an Aircraft Director). For each failure, a time penalty of 5 seconds is applied for each failed acquisition of a Director and 5-10 seconds for failing to recognize a task.
Latencies
GC and VHSC systems are also expected to have latencies in task execution, albeit for two different reasons. The source of latency in GC systems comes from software processing as the system attempts to translate the hand gestures of the Director into understandable action commands. Prior research shows this requires anywhere <<1 to 3 seconds [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] . This latency is then modeled as a uniform distribution over the range [0, 3] , randomly sampled and applied to the start of every action commanded by a Director. VHSC systems incur latency related to the Handler's ability to process tasks through the supplied GUI. This interaction is described in the next section.
UAV Routing Methods
The final major difference between UAV Control Architectures involves how they are issued taxi commands and routed through the flight deck. As described earlier, GC systems still operate under "zone coverage," with crew communicating instructions through hand gestures. This is largely the same as the MC vehicles modeled for current operations, although the GC vehicles are affected by the failure rates and latencies described above.
VHSC systems do not rely on the crew for taxi commands, instead relying on commands issued from the Handler through a Graphical User Interface, which requires modeling the behavior of the Handler in operating such a system. As described previously, the operator functions as a queuing 11 server, which requires the definition of both a service time and a queuing policy for managing tasks.
For flight deck operations, experienced Handlers would likely operate under a "highest priority first" policy, prioritizing aircraft nearest to their assigned catapults in order to keep traffic flowing on the deck. If vehicles are of equal priority, the vehicle that has waited longest in the queue would be serviced.
The time required to process tasks is taken from prior research by Nehme [11] , whose research involved operators controlling a team of unmanned vehicles through a VHSC-style interface. Nehme characterized the "idle" task, in which operators assigned a new transit task to a waiting vehicle, as normally distributed with a mean of 3.19 seconds and standard deviation of 7.19 seconds (bounded [0, ∞]). The idle task described by Nehme is analogous to the action of assigning taxi tasks to idling aircraft on the flight deck, so this same distribution will be used within MASCS for the baseline model of VHSC systems. This interaction time occurs for each individual vehicle in the queue; thus, there is a significant penalty for including additional vehicles in the VHSC queuing system that has been characterized in many previous studies (see [24, 34] for examples).
Additionally, since this style of routing does not rely on the network of crew on the flight deck, the Handler can also assign longer taxi tasks on the flight deck -taxiing from aft to forward, barring other constraints, could be done in a single motion rather than requiring multiple handoffs between Directors. The taxi paths, however, would largely stay the same. These same routing changes also would occur for the SHSC architecture, which enable a single operator, with the help of a scheduling algorithm, to simultaneously define task lists for all vehicles. As prior work has demonstrated that even complex planning algorithms have trouble decomposing the geometric constraints on the flight deck and provide little benefit over human planning [23] , the same Handler planning heuristics applied to the other CAs are applied here. The SHSC architecture would also change some roles on the flight deck; Aircraft Directors would no longer be utilized in the same fashion as in current Manual Control (MC) operations, and some method of controlling the MC aircraft (either remotely in the same manner as the UAVs, or providing the human pilot with guidance indicators) must also be developed. The second safety protocol, Area Separation, segregates unmanned vehicles and manned vehicles into two different operating areas on the flight deck. Manned aircraft are moved forward (to the right side of the figure) and UAVs aft; aircraft are only assigned to catapults within their given area (Fig. 2) . As long as at least one member of each group is on the flight deck, this segregation remains in place. The third option, Temporal Separation, separates vehicles based on schedule. Manned aircraft are again parked forward and unmanned parked aft, but all manned aircraft are launched first in the mission. Once the last manned aircraft has been assigned and cleared the interior of the deck, unmanned aircraft are allowed to begin operations. The fourth option combines the Temporal and Area protocols into one, launching all manned aircraft first from only the forward catapults, after which unmanned aircraft begin operations. The increase in constraints on operations from the Dynamic Separation only (DS) only to Temporal+Area (T+A) case should increase the safety of flight deck operations: interactions between aircraft should be minimized at this level, although it should come at a cost of productivity.
III. Monte Carlo Simulation
Experimental tests simulated each of the three unmanned vehicle control architectures -Gesture Control (GC), Vehicle-based Human Supervisory Control (VHSC), and System-based Human Supervisory Control (SHSC) -in missions using 22 aircraft and each of the four safety protocols. Depiction of Temporal Separation using identical numbers of UAVs and manned aircraft. All manned aircraft would be assigned and launched first with access to the entire flight deck.
Once manned taxi operations are complete, unmanned aircraft would begin operations.
Missions also used three different mission Compositions: 100% homogeneous (all 22 aircraft are the same), 50% unmanned (11 are unmanned), or 25% (5 unmanned). Differences in mission Composition lead to changes in how the safety protocols are applied to operations. Under Area Separation, a Composition of 50% unmanned vehicles means that equal numbers of manned and unmanned aircraft have access to equal numbers of catapults (the unmanned aircraft to the two aft catapults, manned aircraft to the two forward). These groups should then launch at the same rate, and the Area Separation constraint is applicable for generally the entire mission. For Area Separation using only a 25% unmanned Composition, the small number of unmanned aircraft will complete their launches relatively early on in the mission; after they have launched, the Area Separation constraint can be relaxed and manned aircraft can be allowed access to the entire flight deck. Similar differences occur for the Temporal+Area cases. In these, operations begin with only manned aircraft 14 being sent to only forward catapults. This neglects half of the available catapults on the flight and should decrease the efficiency of operations; this means that the 25% Composition case (which uses more manned aircraft) should take much longer to complete that the 50% Composition case (and both should take longer than other Safety Protocol options). This trend in results suggests that, in and of itself, increasing the constraints on operations through the application of safety protocols reduces the number of interactions between aircraft on the flight deck (see Table 1 ). The unconstrained DS case provides the worst performance while the highly constrained T+A provides the best. However, the benefits of the increased constraints at the T+A level come at a cost: the average LD across all cases using the T+A protocol is 36.67 minute, significantly larger than the averages for Temporal (25.84), Area (24.71), and Dynamic Separation (24.60). Additionally, the use of 25% unmanned Composition under T+A is more detrimental than the 50% Composition setting. Because the former uses more manned aircraft in operations, it takes longer to complete the manned phase than under the 50% case. However, because the 25% case constrains operations for a longer period of time, it also produces smaller (better) THVA values for the SHSC and GC architectures. A second interesting phenomenon is the performance of the SHSC control architecture, which appears as squares in Figure 4 : SHSC provides both the best performance (under the T+A protocol)
as well and the worst performance (under the DS protocol). These variations can also be described in terms of constraints. The SHSC control architecture is the least constrained of the control architectures, being limited neither by the "zone coverage" routing structure nor by interactions with a central operator. Aircraft are free to execute their own tasks and able to move through longer individual taxi segments on the flight deck. Not surprisingly, given this lack of constraints, SHSC performs the worst under the also unconstrained Dynamic Separation safety protocol. Interestingly, however, under the significant constraints of the T+A protocol it generates the lowest THVA values of any single test case.
This range of performance contributes to SHSC having some of the worst overall performance of any control architectures for the THVA metric (Table 2) . A Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrates This is likely an artifact of the queuing policy or prioritizing aircraft nearest to catapults; because operations generally flow in the same direction, these vehicles are "in front" of most other aircraft.
Moving these aircraft first provides space for the other aircraft to move, limiting the number of chances for vehicles to come too close to one another. While the GC system appears to encounter similar latencies, the random failures encountered by vehicles do not increase the spacing between vehicles; in fact, it appears to reduce the spacing. Because failures are random, there is a greater chance for vehicles "in front" of others to fail. When that vehicle fails, there is nothing preventing aircraft behind it from taxiing forward and coming close to the stopped vehicle, increasing the number of THVA violations.
B. Effects on Crew Safety
Two other measures looked at the interactions of crew with aircraft during operations. While the safety protocols do not explicitly change how crew interact with aircraft, the changes in routing that result will affect the patterns of traffic and which crew are utilized. Table 3 for descriptive statistics). What differentiates VHSC and SHSC cases from the rest are the fact that neither utilizes the "zone coverage" routing scheme on the flight deck; instead, they are given greater freedom to move around the deck while being assigned escorts to follow them through the deck. Under SHSC, manned aircraft also do not use the zone coverage mechanic; manned aircraft in VHSC do, however. Viewing the effects of the safety protocols (Table 4) can be attributed to how operations are conducted: each emphasizes routing aircraft through the "Street" area of the flight deck (Fig. 1 ). This area includes one more crew member than the Fantail area but in a smaller total area; emphasizing operations in this area requires more interaction with the crew, increasing the number of times that crew are too close to aircraft. Interestingly, however, when tracking the total duration in which these violations occur, the results are quite different ( Figure 6 ). The performance of the SHSC system as compared to VHSC is also interesting. It suggests that, although the escorts active for SHSC operations are continually moving in and out of the primary halo area, they are only in the area for short periods of time. The poor performance of VHSC can likely be attributed to the fact that it uses both escorts for unmanned aircraft and zone coverage for the remaining manned aircraft. It should also be noted that, for these two architectures, the escorts assigned to vehicles are optional: unmanned vehicles in these systems can taxi without human aid.
This would reduce the PHV and DPHV values for both architectures, but for SHSC these values would be zero. cantly different from one another. These results indicate a similar phenomenon as the SHSC system: that both Temporal and T+A cases results in a high number of violations, but the duration of each violation is comparatively smaller than under the Area and DS only protocols. Although the total number of violations is higher, the duration of each is far smaller under these two protocols. For aircraft carrier flight deck operations, these results suggest that safety is primarily influenced by the structure of operations and the constraints imposed therein. The structure of operations refers to the number of aircraft used in mission operations and the mix of unmanned and manned aircraft within that total. Constraints, in this work, relate to the safety protocols and the limitations they impose on when and where vehicles can be active on the flight deck. Interactions between these two factors require changes in the assignment of aircraft to resources on the flight deck, leading to characteristically different evolutions of missions. It is these differences in mission evolution that drive differences in safety measures.
Additionally, the types of delays and latencies that affect operations were also shown to be significant. The delays in VHSC systems pause aircraft in place while those closest to catapults are moved forward, freeing more space for movement. In GC operations, all vehicles have equal chances to become delayed due to system failures, allowing aircraft to taxi closer to those in front than would be desired. However, the undelayed and minimally constrained SHSC architecture demonstrated a wide range of performance: under no constraints, it provided some of the worst vehicle safety metrics while under high constraints provided the best.
Most importantly, these results demonstrate that a tradeoff exists in terms of the safety of flight deck operations in the current operating paradigm. Not only does this tradeoff occur between measures of safety and productivity, it occurs across different measures of safety. There is no single setting of control architecture, safety protocol, and mission Composition that provides clearly superior performance across all metrics. However, the factors that are shown to be a driver of safety performance at the mission level are characteristic of the flight deck system as a wholethe number and types of aircraft, the number of crew, the role of the crew, and the selection of safety protocols. The interactive effects of these settings that drive variations in performance 25 in missions utilizing 22 aircraft operating simultaneously would not be observable when testing individual aircraft. In considering the introduction of unmanned vehicles in this and other similar environments, these factors should be taken into account. It is likely that completely reconfiguring flight deck operations -moving away from the current standard patterns of traffic, planning, and crew interactions -would be beneficial to the safety measures presented here.
Additionally, further exploration of the effects of vehicle performance parameters on operations is also warranted; the models used within MASCS testing assume mature vehicles and experienced vehicle operators, and the results of this work may not hold true in early phases of deployment.
Similarly, these results are fully contingent on the definition of behavioral rules that govern the control architectures and safety protocols within the modeled flight deck environment. Changes to any of these rules might result in very different results than what has been observed here. The generalizability of these results is highly dependent on the similarity of the physical layout of the environment and the behaviors of human and vehicle agents in the environment. While it is difficult
to know to what extent these results directly transfer to other related environments, given the unique characteristics and choreography on the aircraft carrier flight deck, the agent-based nature of MASCS enables it to be quickly extended to other domains through a simple redefinition of agents, behavioral rules, and task definitions. Extensions of MASCS to these domains are significant areas of future work.
